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The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) recently commissioned a nationwide survey  
of businesses called the Australian Business Assessment of Computer User Security 
(ABACUS) survey (see Richards 2009). This study aimed to identify the prevalence, nature, 
costs and impacts of computer security incidents against Australian businesses during 
2006–07. Computer security incidents were defined in the survey as any unauthorised use, 
damage, monitoring attack or theft of business information technology. Common computer 
security incidents include viruses and other malicious code, spyware, phishing, sabotage of 
network or data and denial of service attacks.
The ABACUS survey used a random, weighted sample of Australian businesses, stratified 
by industry sector and business size, to enable generalisations to be made about the  
entire population of Australian businesses. In total, 4,000 ABACUS questionnaires were 
completed by Australian businesses, representing a response rate of 29 percent (for  
a detailed discussion of the methodology of the ABACUS study see Challice (2009)).
The ABACUS study found that a majority of businesses (80%; n=2,881) that used 
information technology reported experiencing no computer security incidents during the  
12 month period ending 30 June 2007. In the study, ‘experiencing a computer security 
incident’ meant that a business detected an incident. By definition, the survey was not able 
to capture incidents that businesses did not detect; the survey only capturing detected or 
identified computer security incidents. As a proportion of the overall sample, 12 percent 
(n=435) of businesses experienced one to five computer security incidents, one percent 
experienced six to 10 incidents (n=44) and one percent experienced more than 10 incidents 
(n=48). Six percent (n=212) of respondents were unable to quantify the number of computer 
security incidents their business had experienced.
Research has shown that businesses are concerned about the risks associated with 
computer security incidents and believe that victimisation is widespread (Nykodym, Taylor  
& Vilela 2005; Smith, Grabosky & Urbas 2004). A survey commissioned by IBM (Ho 2006) 
found that about half of Australian businesses perceive computer security incidents as a 
greater threat and more costly to their organisation than physical crime.
The literature on computer security incidents posits a range of factors as potential 
predictors of whether businesses experience computer security incidents. Industry sector, 
for example, is widely held to be a key determinant, with financial organisations deemed 
most likely to be targeted (IBM Global Technology Services 2008). Business size is also 
Foreword  |  Drawing on data from 
the Australian Business Assessment  
of Computer User Security (ABACUS) 
survey, this paper examines a range of 
factors that may influence businesses’ 
likelihood of being victimised by a 
computer security incident. It has been 
suggested that factors including business 
size, industry sector, level of outsourcing, 
expenditure on computer security 
functions and types of computer security 
tools and/or policies used may influence 
the probability of particular businesses 
experiencing such incidents. This paper 
uses probability modelling to test whether 
this is the case for the 4,000 businesses 
that responded to the ABACUS survey.  
It was found that the industry sector that 
a business belonged to, and business 
expenditure on computer security, were 
not related to businesses’ likelihood  
of detecting computer security incidents. 
Instead, the number of employees that  
a business has and whether computer 
security functions were outsourced were 
found to be key indicators of businesses’ 
likelihood of detecting incidents. Some  
of the implications of these findings are 
considered in this paper.
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The dependent variable in this study is 
whether the business was identified as a 
victim of a computer security incident during 
the 2006–07 financial year. The possible 
results were categorised as 0 for those  
who had not been a victim and 1 for those 
who had been impacted at least once that 
is, whether the business was aware of 
having been victimised. Of course, 
undetected incidents are not captured by 
this survey..
Industry sector
The ABACUS survey asked respondents 
from 19 industry sectors whether they had 
experienced a computer security incident 
during the previous financial year. The 
industry sectors surveyed were:
• agriculture, forestry and fishing;
• mining and manufacturing;
• electricity, gas, water and waste services;
• construction;
• wholesale trade;
• retail trade;
• accommodation and food services;
• transport, postal and warehousing;
• information media and 
telecommunications;
• financial and insurance services;
• rental, hiring and real estate services;
• professional, scientific and technical 
services;
• administrative and support services;
• public administration and safety;
• education and training;
• health care and social assistance;
• arts and recreational services; and
• other services (see Table 1).
The financial and insurance services sector 
was chosen as the omitted variable in  
this model as it is widely accepted in the 
literature on computer security incidents 
against businesses that financial sector 
organisations are likely targets for 
perpetrators of computer security incidents 
(see IBM Global Technology Services 2008; 
Symantec 2006).
As Table 1 indicates, five of the industry 
sectors were significantly less likely than the 
financial and insurance services sector to be 
victimised by a computer security incident 
during the 12 month period. These sectors 
2,167. The extent of missing values differed 
across each of the variables, according to a 
range of factors, including whether a ‘don’t 
know’ option was available. This is typical  
in surveys that investigate sensitive topic 
areas; missing values are particularly 
common for survey questions about 
business turnover. This paper uses models 
of qualitative choice which allow for analysis 
of the likelihood of a given explanatory 
variable having a significant impact on a 
defined dependent variable. It is important 
to note that in probability modelling, 
coefficient values represent whether the 
variable of interest is more or less likely  
than the omitted variable to impact upon  
the probability of a business being victimised. 
Where the prefix of a coefficient value is 
positive (+), the business is more likely to be 
victimised. Conversely, where the coefficient 
value is negative (–), the business is less 
likely to be victimised. The size of the 
coefficient does not, however, indicate the 
impact of the variable concerned, relative  
to the omitted variable, on the probability  
of a business’s victimisation. That is, a high 
figure does not necessarily indicate a strong 
impact and a low figure does not necessarily 
indicate a weak impact.
Instead, odds ratios (OR) can be used to 
determine the impact of each variable on 
businesses’ likelihood of being victimised by 
a computer security incident. For example, 
an odds ratio of 0.65 suggests the variable 
concerned is 35 percent less likely than  
the omitted variable (1–0.65) to lead to 
victimisation. Conversely, an OR of 1.65 
indicates the variable concerned is 65 percent 
more likely (1.65–1.00) to lead to victimisation.
Another key feature of probability modelling 
is the requirement to select and omit a 
particular variable from each model. Results 
from the modelling analysis therefore 
represent the impact of the remaining 
variable(s) on the probability of victimisation, 
relative to the omitted variable.
In the current study, the selection of omitted 
variables was informed by the research 
questions driving the original study (see 
Richards 2009) and by existing literature  
on this subject area. The current study also 
utilises conventional statistical practice  
in the social sciences for evaluating the 
statistical significance of the modelling 
results—that is, results are deemed 
statistically significant when they have a 
‘probability value’ of less than five percent.
commonly proposed as a factor that  
may determine businesses’ likelihood of 
experiencing computer security incidents. 
For example, the Department of Trade  
and Industry (2006) found that in the  
United Kingdom, a higher proportion of 
large businesses reported experiencing 
malicious computer security incidents than 
businesses overall.
This paper provides a statistical analysis  
of predictors of businesses’ victimisation by 
computer security incidents. Data from the 
ABACUS study (Richards 2009) suggested 
that some variables might influence 
businesses’ likelihood of victimisation.  
The data revealed, for example, somewhat 
unclear relationships between the number of 
computer security incidents experienced and:
• expenditure on computer security;
• respondents’ knowledge of information 
technology; and
• whether businesses outsourced any 
computer security functions.
Two additional variables—businesses’ use 
of computer security tools and policies—
have also been examined here, as it is their 
explicit purpose to limit businesses’ 
exposure to computer security incidents.
This paper therefore examines the impact  
of the following factors on businesses’ 
likelihood of experiencing a computer 
security incident:
• industry sector;
• business size (number of employees);
• respondents’ knowledge of information 
technology;
• computer security tools used;
• computer security policies used;
• outsourcing of computer security 
measures; and
• computer security expenditure.
Probability modelling
The analysis presented in this paper uses 
unweighted data, which is necessary in 
modelling analyses of this type. For more 
detail on the process of weighting data  
and the difference between weighted and 
unweighted data see Challice (2009) and 
Richards (2009). Missing answers and ‘don’t 
know’ responses from all variables, except 
expenditure on computer security, were 
excluded from this analysis. As a result, the 
overall sample was reduced from 4,000 to 
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business size is a significant predictive 
factor in businesses’ likelihood of 
experiencing computer security incidents.
These findings confirm results from 
international studies that suggest that the 
number of employees a business has is 
linked to its likelihood of experiencing a 
computer security incident (see Department 
of Trade and Industry 2006; Rantala 2008). 
This could suggest that larger businesses 
are deemed better targets by cyber criminals. 
Alternatively, it might suggest that larger 
businesses are better able to detect 
computer security incidents and are more 
aware of these incidents than their smaller 
counterparts.
Knowledge of  
information technology
Respondents to the ABACUS survey were 
asked to rate their own level of knowledge 
of information technology as very low, low, 
moderate, high or very high.
The probability modelling analysis found that 
those with very low knowledge of information 
technology were least likely to have identified 
computer security incidents (see Table 3). 
Respondents who rated their knowledge  
as very low were 77 percent less likely  
than those with moderate knowledge (the 
omitted variable) to identify a computer 
security incident during the year. Conversely, 
respondents who rated themselves as 
having a low level of knowledge were  
51 percent less likely than those with 
moderate knowledge to be victimised.
Those with high knowledge and very high 
knowledge were substantially more likely 
(24% and 82% respectively) to identify being 
the victims of a computer security incident.
These results were statistically significant, 
with the exception of those respondents 
who rated their knowledge as high (which 
approached statistical significance at 10%).
In one sense, these findings may seem 
counterintuitive. That is, it might be 
expected that those respondents who 
experienced low levels of computer 
knowledge to have been victimised  
more frequently than those who rated  
their knowledge as high or very high.  
It is important to note, however, that 
respondents with low levels of computer 
knowledge may represent businesses with 
limited information technology infrastructure. 
were health care and social assistance  
(46% less likely), arts and recreation  
(48% less likely), mining (50% less likely), 
construction (52% less likely) and other 
services (69% less likely).
These findings offer some support to the 
widespread perception that businesses from 
the financial services sector are more likely 
to be victimised. It is important to highlight, 
however, that a number of industry sectors 
were not significantly more or less likely  
to experience computer security incidents 
than businesses from the financial sector.  
As such, it appears that the perception  
of financial sector businesses as the most 
likely targets of computer security incidents 
is somewhat overstated. In addition, it is 
important to recognise that businesses from 
the financial and insurance services sector 
may have better computer security measures 
in place and may have a greater awareness 
of having been victimised than businesses 
from industry sectors with lower levels of 
security.
Business size
The ABACUS survey defined small 
businesses as those with zero to  
19 employees, medium businesses as  
those with 20 to 199 employees and large 
businesses as those with 200 or more 
employees.
The modelling analysis by business size 
used medium businesses as the omitted 
variable. Results therefore pertain to the 
likelihood of small or large firms being 
victimised, relative to medium businesses.
As might be expected, large businesses 
appear more likely and small businesses 
less likely, to be the victims of computer 
security incidents than medium businesses. 
Large businesses were a substantial  
146 percent more likely than medium 
businesses to be victimised. Conversely, 
small businesses were 29 percent less likely 
to be victimised. Both of these results were 
statistically significant and suggest that 
Table 1 Modelling results, by sector
n OR CIa p
Accommodation/food services 71 0.59 0.27–1.27 0.18
Administrative/support services 84 0.94 0.48–1.83 0.85
Agriculture, forestry/fishing 196 0.72 0.41–1.26 0.25
Arts/recreational services 129 0.52 0.27–1.00 0.05**
Construction 138 0.48 0.25–0.93 0.03**
Education/training 110 1.05 0.57–1.92 0.89
Electricity, gas, water/waste services 83 0.54 0.26–1.14 0.11
Financial/insurance services (omitted variable) 118 – – –
Health care/social assistance 174 0.54 0.30–0.98 0.04**
Information media/telecommunications 85 0.58 0.28–1.20 0.14
Manufacturing 132 0.75 0.41–1.38 0.36
Mining 104 0.50 0.25–1.01 0.05**
Other services 45 0.31 0.10–0.95 0.04**
Professional, scientific/technical services 180 0.86 0.49–1.50 0.59
Public administration/safety 52 0.86 0.39–1.90 0.71
Rental, hiring/real estate 71 0.79 0.38–1.63 0.52
Retail trade 193 0.57 0.32–1.01 0.06
Transport, postal/warehousing 105 0.71 0.37–1.36 0.30
Wholesale trade 97 0.68 0.35–1.34 0.27
McFadden R-squared 0.01
LR statistic 20.71
Probability(LR stat) 0.29
Akaike information criterion 0.93
Schwarz criterion 0.98
a: The column CI in this and the following Tables refers to the 95 percent confidence interval for the estimate of the odds ratio
**=statistically significant at p≤0.05
Source: AIC, ABACUS 2008 [computer file]
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• anti-fraud and malware tools—software 
or hardware designed to prevent fraud or 
malware affecting a system or network;
• detection and monitoring tools—software 
or hardware designed to monitor the use 
of a specific computer system or network; 
and
• security management tools—software 
or hardware designed with the goal of 
managing and improving the security  
of computer systems or networks.
For a detailed glossary of terms used in  
the ABACUS study see Challice (2009).
The probability modelling analysis indicates 
that businesses that used security 
management tools, and detection and 
monitoring tools were more like to 
experience computer security incidents 
(128% more likely and 63% more likely  
than those without any security tools 
respectively).
This may indicate that commonly used 
computer security tools, such as firewalls, 
intrusion detection systems and intrusion 
prevention systems, were effective tools  
for detecting computer security incidents 
against businesses during the 2006–07 
financial year. As noted above, businesses 
with more robust computer security 
infrastructure in place may be more likely  
to detect computer security incidents. 
Outsourcing of  
computer security
ABACUS respondents were asked to 
indicate whether their business had 
outsourced any computer security 
measures during the 2006–07 financial year.
• physical security tools—devices such as 
locks that are used to secure computer 
hardware;
• cryptography—the process of scrambling 
plain text into cipher text (encryption) and 
then back again (decryption);
• authentication tools—hardware or 
software designed to verify the identity  
of a user, process or device;
Those who experienced higher levels of 
knowledge, however, may work for 
businesses with substantial information 
technology infrastructure. Such businesses 
may be likely to be both more likely targets 
of computer security incidents and better 
able to detect such incidents. In addition, 
higher levels of information technology 
knowledge may result in better computer 
security practices and therefore an 
increased awareness of computer security 
incidents.
Computer security tools
ABACUS respondents were asked to 
indicate the types of computer security tools 
their business had used during the 2006–07 
financial year. Computer security tools  
were grouped into physical security tools, 
cryptographic and authentication tools, 
anti-fraud and malware tools, detection and 
monitoring tools, and security management 
tools and were defined as follows:
Table 2 Modelling results, by business size
n OR CI p
Small 1,786 0.71 0.523–0.956 0.02**
Medium (omitted variable) 308 – – –
Large 73 2.46 1.43–4.24 0.00**
McFadden R-squared 0.013
LR statistic 25.797
Probability (LR stat) 0.000
Akaike information criterion 0.917
Schwarz criterion 0.924
**=statistically significant at p≤0.05
Source: AIC, ABACUS 2008 [computer file]
Table 3 Modelling results, by respondents’ knowledge of information technology
n OR CI p
Very low 603 0.23 0.06–0.97 0.04**
Low 211 0.49 0.30–0.81 0.01**
Moderate (omitted variable) 1,121 – – –
High 187 1.24 0.96–1.60 0.10
Very high 45 1.82 1.27–2.61 0.00**
McFadden R-squared 0.02 0.02
LR statistic 32.24 32.24
Probability(LR stat) 0.00 0.00
Akaike information criterion 0.92 0.92
Schwarz criterion 0.93 0.93
**=statistically significant at p≤0.05
Source: AIC, ABACUS 2008 [computer file]
Table 4 Modelling results, by type of computer security tools used
n OR CI p
Physical security 1,252 0.92 0.71–1.19 0.51
Cryptographic/authentication 1,429 1.12 0.84–1.50 0.44
Anti-fraud/malware 1,971 1.57 0.81–3.03 0.18
Detection/monitoring 989 1.63 1.27–2.09 0.00**
Security management 1,708 2.28 1.50–3.46 0.00**
No security tools (omitted variable) 124 – – –
McFadden R-squared 0.04
LR statistic 71.34
Probability (LR stat) 0.00
Akaike information criterion 0.90
Schwarz criterion 0.91
**=statistically significant at p≤0.05
Source: AIC, ABACUS 2008 [computer file]
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In both cases, computer security spending 
had no practical impact on the likelihood of 
a business being victimised by a computer 
security incident (the OR in both cases  
was 1.00). Only the former (information 
technology security expenditure as a 
proportion of total information technology 
expenditure) was statistically significant 
(p<0.01).
Conclusion
The explanatory power of each of the 
models reported in this study (the share  
of the variance in the dependent variable 
explained by the independent variable(s)) 
was quite small, as can be seen in the 
McFadden R-squared figure in each Table.
Considered as a whole, the variables 
analysed—industry sector, business size, 
respondents’ knowledge of information 
technology, types of computer security tools 
used, types of computer security policies 
used, whether businesses outsourced 
computer security functions and businesses’ 
information technology security expenditure 
as a proportion of total information 
technology expenditure—explain 8.6 percent 
of businesses’ likelihood of experiencing a 
computer security incident. Although the 
model left a substantial proportion of the 
variance associated with experiencing a 
computer security incident unexplained,  
this is still an encouraging result for this 
modelling design.
It is also important to note that the absolute 
contributions of each of these factors varied 
The modelling analysis found that 
outsourcing of computer security functions 
played an important role in determining 
whether a business identified as a victim  
of a computer security incident.
Businesses that outsourced one or  
more computer security functions were  
110 percent more likely than those that  
did not outsource any computer security to 
identify as having experienced a computer 
security incident during the year. This is a 
key finding of this analysis of the ABACUS 
data.
It is widely believed that outsourcing 
computer security functions can result  
in weakened security for businesses’ 
information technology systems (Choo, 
Smith & McCusker 2007 ; Ernst and Young 
2009). The analysis suggests that this  
belief may be well-founded. However, an 
alternative interpretation of this finding is 
that outsourced computer security providers 
may be more likely to detect computer 
security incidents, leading to higher rates  
of reported incidents. 
Computer security policies
ABACUS respondents were also asked  
to indicate the types of computer security 
policies their business had used during the 
2006–07 financial year. Computer security 
policies were grouped into:
• staff/user-related policies—security 
policies that are directed at the staff  
of a business;
• security-testing policies—such as system 
audit policies or risk assessment policies;
• data-related policies—polices related to 
the handling, storage and security of data 
for a business;
• incident response policies—policies that 
govern appropriate responses after a 
computer security incident has occurred;
• external business policies—such as 
payment system supplier policies; and
• wireless security policies—policies that 
govern which types of security practices 
are used for the protection of data that is 
stored and transferred between wireless 
devices.
The analysis shows that different computer 
security policies have statistically significantly 
different impacts on the likelihood of a 
business becoming a victim of a computer 
security incident. Businesses with staff/
user-related policies were 92 percent more 
likely than those with no security policies 
(the omitted variable) to experience a 
computer security incident. Businesses with 
wireless policies were 47 percent more likely 
to experience a computer security incident. 
By contrast, businesses that used external 
business security policies were 32 percent 
less likely than those without any security 
policies to be victimised.
Expenditure on  
computer security
Finally, the ABACUS survey asked 
respondents about their total expenditure  
on computer security during the 2006–07 
financial year.
In contrast to the other variables examined 
in the modelling reported in this study (which 
used categorical data), information on 
computer security spending was collected 
as continuous data. That is, business 
respondents were asked to provide a dollar 
estimate of their expenditure, rather than 
merely indicate which broad expenditure 
bracket their business belonged to.
The modelling utilised two measures  
of computer security spending:
• information technology security 
expenditure as a proportion of total 
information technology expenditure; and
• information technology security 
expenditure as a proportion of total 
turnover.
Table 5 Modelling results, by type of computer security policy used
n OR CI p
Staff/user-related policies 2,167 1.92 1.28–2.87 0.00**
Security testing policies 2,167 0.89 0.62–1.29 0.55
Data-related policies 2,167 1.23 0.81–1.87 0.32
Incident response policies 2,167 1.33 0.92–1.92 0.13
External business policies 2,167 0.68 0.46–1.01 0.06
Wireless security policies 2,167 1.47 1.07–2.02 0.02**
No computer security policies 
(omitted variable)
– – – –
McFadden R-squared 0.04
LR statistic 84.25
Probability (LR stat) 0.00
Akaike information criterion 0.89
Schwarz criterion 0.91
**=statistically significant at p≤0.05
Source: AIC, ABACUS 2008 [computer file]
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Nonetheless, the findings presented here 
suggest that in relation to preventing 
computer security incidents, businesses 
might consider the following strategies:
• maintaining tight regulatory controls over 
computer security functions that are 
outsourced. Although the heightened risk 
of victimisation among businesses that 
outsourced computer security functions 
may be a result of these businesses 
having greater detection capabilities, a 
range of risks also have been associated 
with outsourcing, and businesses should 
be aware of these (Choo, Smith & 
McCusker 2007; Colwill & Gray 2007); 
and
• ensuring that basic computer security 
tools, such as firewalls, intrusion detection 
and intrusion prevention systems are in 
place and up-to-date.
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noticeably. The types of computer security 
policies used (4.2%) and the types of 
computer security tools used (3.6%) had  
the greatest explanatory power.
Whether businesses outsourced computer 
security functions (1.7%), respondents’ 
knowledge of information technology 
(1.6%), business size (1.3%) and industry 
sector (1%) explained less of the variance  
in businesses’ experiences of computer 
security incidents. Importantly, businesses’ 
computer security expenditure explained 
just 0.5 percent of the variance. It should  
be noted that these individual contributions 
total 13.9 percent—well above the 
combined total of 8.6 percent. This is due  
to a degree of co-linearity among some of 
the variables, which is to be expected in an 
analysis of this kind. A correlation analysis 
found notable levels of practical and 
statistical significance between, for example, 
industry sector and business size, industry 
sector and types of computer security 
policies used, business size and 
respondents’ knowledge of information 
technology and business size and types  
of computer security tools used.
Overall, the variables considered in the 
ABACUS survey, and analysed in detail 
here, therefore appear to explain only a 
small fraction of businesses’ likelihood of 
becoming a victim of a computer security 
incident.
This finding suggests that many of the 
factors widely considered to influence 
businesses’ probability of being victimised—
including industry sector, use of computer 
security tools and outsourcing—are of less 
importance than previously thought. A range 
of variables other than those explored in the 
ABACUS study and analysed in detail in this 
paper may determine businesses’ likelihood 
of becoming the victim of a computer 
security incident.
